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Facing the Ghost of Cruikshank in
Constitutional Law
Martha T. McCluskey
Teaching constitutional law to make Black Lives Matter requires confronting
the race-based violence institutionalized in American law. In Ferguson and
beyond, news reports of suspicious deaths of unarmed African-Americans
at the hands of race-conscious state authority persist as a predictable reality
smoothly coinciding with a constitutional jurisprudence that claims to
embrace principles of negative liberty and colorblind formal equality. The
federal Justice Department has taken action to correct constitutional violations
in Ferguson and in other municipal police departments in recent decades.1
Yet despite some successful city reforms, the pattern of violations continues,
with federal enforcement often hampered by resistance and by inadequate
resources.2
The standard story of constitutional law encourages acquiescence in the
continuing routine oﬃcial racial violence by keeping it out of view as a ﬁxed
and murky background fact. The Constitution’s failure to enforce racial justice
seems to be a problem of inherent limits that need not disturb general faith
in the Constitution as a beacon of democracy and liberty. As Robert Gordon
noted in an essay on the value of critical legal studies, legal education tends to
perpetuate injustice by teaching that law cannot change anything important
and substantive in society, except perhaps at the margins.3 To instead challenge
the long history of law’s complicity in devaluing black lives, we should focus
attention on how the Court has powerfully reshaped the Constitution to make
protection of black lives appear beyond the reasonable reach of law.
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Disregarding Black Lives in the Constitutional Canon
The initial constitutional law course is not easily structured to give a clear
picture of how constitutional law turns American law enforcement into a source
of fear rather than protection in many communities of color.4 A constellation
of dubious constitutional doctrines works together to produce and reinforce
this result, yet students are likely to study each of these as separate, relatively
technical and formal rules without the time, details, and context needed to
grasp the cumulative impact.5 The problem of racialized police violence does
not neatly appear in the case lineup of the standard introductory constitutional
law course. Indirectly if not directly, the basic course is likely to reinforce the
troubling lesson that this violence does not threaten the legitimacy of the
American legal order.6
Taking my syllabus as a typical example, students encounter police brutality
as the occasion for the Court to limit standing to challenge city police policy in
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons7 (without judicial discussion of racial disparities). Then
later in the semester they study McCleskey v. Kemp,8 in which the Court ruled that
the disparate racial results of Georgia’s death penalty do not count as evidence
of race discrimination triggering heightened scrutiny. In Lyons, the Court ruled
that the risk of harm from policies supporting future unconstitutional police
violence is too speculative and abstract to be legally justiciable, even in a case
brought by an individual nearly killed by this violence. In Kemp, the Court
refused to recognize racial intent in Georgia’s policy of wide discretion in
death sentencing, despite stark statistical evidence that this discretion is used
so that black lives do not matter equally in a state that historically designed the
death penalty to promote white supremacy.
These rulings fall into place in students’ course outlines as settled doctrine,
even if taught as unsettling. In the standard syllabus, current constitutional
agonizing about racial injustice tends to focus on the possible harms to white
students from educational aﬃrmative action programs—harms that the Court
takes as suﬃciently palpable and substantial to merit heightened judicial

4.

See, e.g., Emmarie Huetteman, Lynch Says Death in Police Custody Highlights Fears of Blacks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2015, at A12 (quoting Attorney General Loretta Lynch, “I think that we have
a situation where many minority communities for so long have felt that law enforcement was
coming in to essentially enforce laws against them, not to protect them.”).

5.

For an insightful analysis of the doctrines, see Shakeer Rahman & Sam Barrdec, Editorial,
Eric Garner and the Legal Rules that Enable Police Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014, at A23.

6.

See Bruce Hay, The Silence of the Lawyers, COMMON DREAMS (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.
commondreams.org/views/2014/12/07/silence-lawyers (criticizing the mainstream professional
silence about America’s unequal criminal justice system).
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attention and constitutional protection.9 I have stopped including aﬃrmative
action cases in my course, in part to avoid this warped vision.10
In addition, I have been experimenting with incorporating United States v.
Cruikshank11 into my basic constitutional law course using teaching materials
James Gray Pope has developed and generously shared with me.12 This essay’s
exploratory thoughts grow out of the challenges of including Cruikshank in
an introductory ﬁrst-year course, along with my overwhelming sense of the
glaring and deepening deceptions of the contemporary constitutional law
framework.
Putting Cruikshank in its Canonical Place
United States v. Cruikshank “belongs at the center of our constitutional
narrative,” as James Gray Pope argues in his important article on the case.13
This 1876 Supreme Court decision barred the Justice Department from using
the federal Enforcement Act of 187014 to prosecute a prominent instance of
white supremacist terrorism against African-American political participation
after the Civil War. Cruikshank’s ghastly disregard for democracy and racial
justice deserves a place alongside the ghost of Lochner. By keeping Cruikshank
“safely oﬀ stage,” in Pope’s words, the current canon can tell a “happy story”
of racial progress from Plessy to Brown led by judges pushing constitutional
boundaries.15 In that story, currently persisting injustices appear to have
exhausted constitutional law’s power for heroic change.
Cruikshank arose from a massacre of black Republicans in the courthouse
of Colfax, Louisiana, by white Democrats disputing the results of the 1872
election in Grand Parish, a majority black district.16 Aﬃrming the Circuit Court
decision by Justice Bradley, and largely adopting his reasoning, the Supreme
Court ruled that because these murders violated no federal constitutional
rights, the federal government lacked legal authority to prosecute the crimes
under the Enforcement Act of 1870, enacted to quell violence by the Ku Klux
9.

See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 284-85 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Lyons should preclude standing for prospective relief for a claim of discrimination by a white
student challenging the University of Michigan’s aﬃrmative action policy).

10.

A better approach would be to cast aﬃrmative action in light of a revised constitutional
narrative showing the Court’s role in limiting democratic political coalitions for racial
justice, see discussion of Carolene Products, infra note 71 and accompanying text.

11.

92 U.S. 542 (1876).

12.

James Gray Pope, The Reconstruction Amendments (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
ﬁle with author).

13.

James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Belongs at the
Heart of the Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 385, 446 (2014)
[hereinafter Snubbed Landmark].
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Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 391.
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Klan and other white supremacist paramilitary groups. The Act made it a
crime for any person to join in a conspiracy to deprive any citizen of “a right or
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.”17
By impeding federal prosecutions, the Cruikshank decisions cleared the
way for violent restoration of a white supremacist legal order that replaced
Reconstruction with the Jim Crow system of segregation, inequality, and racial
violence that reigned largely unchecked by the Court for nearly a century.18 In
1875, after Bradley’s initial Circuit Court ruling in Cruikshank had “decisively
disrupted federal enforcement eﬀorts” to a surge of white terrorism,19
Louisiana’s governor reported to Congress that Cruikshank “establish[ed] the
principle that hereafter no white man could be punished for killing a Negro.”20
Cruikshank’s enormous historical and doctrinal impact continues to structure
American law and politics in many ways, as Pope explains, even though the
case itself has largely receded from mainstream view.21 Cruikshank can help
shed light on the wrongs of Ferguson by showing how racial inequality and
oppression have been powerfully enforced through judicial support for
systemic racial violence,22 not just by formal government classiﬁcation by race.
In addition, reinstating Cruikshank in the constitutional narrative may sharpen
understanding of the high substantive stakes of the Court’s current array of
seemingly technical limiting doctrines. In doing so, Cruikshank can help push
back against the current canonical tendency to subdue the Constitution’s
substantive aspirations through the ghost of Lochner.
Challenging Lochner’s Updated Anti-Legal Fundamentalism
United States v. Lochner23 commands a central place in the current canon as a
widely repudiated decision reminding us that judges, like other authorities,
wield their power under sway of particular prejudices and politics. More
important, it is used to teach the overarching lesson that judicial protection of
substantive constitutional rights should be tightly constrained to ensure judges
properly stay within their legitimate role of interpreting and applying the law
17.

16 Stat. at 140-41; see Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 401-02.

18.

See Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 392 (noting that the Jim Crow laws of Plessy
and Brown might not have existed if Cruikshank had upheld the convictions); id. at 445-47
(discussing the monumental historical impact of the case).

19.

Id. at 414.

20.

Id. at 415 (quoting Louisiana Gov. William Pitt Kellogg’s 1875 testimony to Congress, as
cited in LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER,
WHITE TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION 147 (2008)).

21.

Id. at 389 (summarizing four current doctrines developed from Cruikshank).

22.

See id. at 391-92 (discussing how the case reveals the Court’s major role was not enforcing
civil rights but rather stripping legislative and executive protection of law and order against
white terrorism).

23.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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rather than making it. Ideally, Cruikshank should help teach a comparably
far-reaching lesson about the Court and the Constitution, taking students
beyond superﬁcially dismissing the case as the inevitable product of the times
or individual judges’ biases, to learn instead that unequal judicial denial of
substantive constitutional rights in the guise of constitutional modesty has
been a major, and ongoing, threat to constitutional legitimacy.
The prevailing story of Lochner’s repudiation lowers constitutional
expectations by establishing an overarching tragic trade-oﬀ: Judicial
intervention to correct problematic government power requires the
exceptionally problematic government power of unelected and elitist federal
judges. According to the narrative, Lochner-era federal courts infused the due
process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments with their own antilabor politics, concocting and selectively applying a fundamental substantive
right to contractual freedom that overrode legislation protecting workers,
consumers, and health and safety. As the canonical example of that trend,
the 1905 Lochner decision invalidated a state law setting a sixty-hour maximum
work week for bakery employees, ruling that this labor regulation violated a
fundamental freedom-of-contract right implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause.24
In Lochner’s shadow, the Civil War Amendments’ cure for America’s
fundamental ﬂaw of slavery appears to have prescribed dangerous medicine.
If judges protect promised constitutional rights to liberty and equality, they
threaten democracy and the rule of law. Showing Lochner’s continuing power to
cast doubt on constitutional transformation, Chief Justice Roberts relied on a
lengthy invocation of Lochner to justify his dissent from the Court’s protection
of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges.25 Justice
Roberts reinscribes and ampliﬁes the message that the Court should disregard
concerns about substantive political fairness and fundamental human rights,
leaving judgments about values and policy to the political branches, especially
when “dramatic social change” may be at stake.26 To avoid the wrongs of
Lochner, the Court properly limits constitutional doctrine to focus primarily on
neutral process, normally leaving substantive decisions about justice to other
authorities.
But as faith in the political process has faded, the lesson of Lochner has tended
to drift backward. In my experience, students readily focus on the illegitimacy
of the political process, viewing legislators and administrators as beholden
to vast inequalities of power, irrationality, and destructive partisanship.
Because the federal government represents big political power, students
tend to accept the idea that it is presumptively more illegitimate than state or
24.

Id.

25.

135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611-26 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting). See also Ian Millhiser, Chief Justice
Roberts’ Marriage Equality Dissent Has a Hidden Message for Conservatives, THINKPROGRESS (June 29,
2015, 8:00 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2015/06/29/3674897/roberts-obergefelldissent-conservatives/ (counting sixteen references to Lochner in this dissenting opinion).

26.

See 135 S. Ct. at 2612.

Facing the Ghost of Cruikshank in Constitutional Law

283

local power, as well as private power. That contemporary popular distrust of
political governance has combined with post-Lochner distrust of constitutional
substantive rights to spawn an updated anti-legal fundamentalism as Lochner’s
legacy.
A widespread sense of government’s diminished legitimacy sets the stage
for a revival of faith in judicial protection of a naturalized realm imagined
to transcend law’s imperfections. In contrast to constitutional substance and
democratic process, this fundamentalism imagines that abstract markets, local
communities, individual market choices, or traditions are governed by superior
forces relatively unsullied by judicial whim, systemic prejudice, or subjective
politics. In this theory, the distortions of government can be further diluted
and disciplined through judicial support for the power of states, communities,
and businesses to resist substantive federal legal protection to better reﬂect
decentralized discretion as the most legitimate source of public values and
policies. Perversely, then, the ghost of Lochner has breathed life and authority
into new incarnations of the dishonored Lochner-era doctrine, justifying a new
revival of judicially created limits on both substantive democratic authority
and substantive human rights.
Many of the conservative Justices’ recently created or enhanced substantive
constitutional limits on government protections have little or no grounding in
constitutional history or text, but nonetheless have been embraced free of their
fear of Lochner’s ghost.27 For example, the Court’s Eleventh Amendment doctrine
barring private rights of action for damages against states to enforce federal
rights explicitly departs from text to rely on pre-constitutional naturalized
law.28 And in an example relevant to the issues of unequal law enforcement
in Ferguson, the Court has recently gone beyond speciﬁc text and history to
develop a fundamental due process right to constitutional protection against
bias in state law enforcement.29 However, the Court narrowly targeted this
new protection to limit state tort damages against corporate defendants.30 This
inconsistent obedience to Lochner’s lessons is partly explained by an implicit
logic that these new fundamental limits represent judicial deference to power
outside the law.

27.

My analysis here counters the liberal hope that Justice Roberts’s dissent reﬂects a new
conservative respect for democratic legislation that might spread to (for instance) voting
rights. See Millhiser, supra note 25 (arguing that Justice Roberts’ dissent may counter recent
scholarly and judicial eﬀorts to rehabilitate Lochner).

28.

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (expanding constitutional limits on remedies for
violation of workers’ federal rights with a doctrine of state sovereign immunity that “neither
derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment”).

29.

Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State Farm, 56 BUFF. L.
REV. 1035 (2008) (discussing the recent constitutional doctrine limiting punitive damage
awards in the case State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)).

30.

Id. at 1043 (contrasting this due process protection for corporate tort defendants to the lack
of constitutional protection for criminal defendants).
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Robin West insightfully captures this emerging conservative vision as a new
paradigm of substantive rights to opt out of public beneﬁts and responsibilities,
in contrast to the civil rights paradigm expanding access to governmental
protection.31 The Court’s newly reconstructed Second Amendment right to
bear arms exempliﬁes this right to exit the social compact, subsuming the rule
of law to an ideal of natural competition.32 West also analyzes as examples
the new judicial and popular interest in protecting new fundamental rights
to opt out of public education, anti-discrimination laws, federal health care
programs, and collective bargaining costs.33 This “exit rights” paradigm helps
undercut constitutional support for democratic civil rights and protections,
lending credibility (for example) to the Court’s rulings limiting Congress’s
power to protect against gender-motivated private violence or gun violence in
schools.34
Given popular skepticism about the democratic legitimacy of contemporary
government, along with a constitutional story that emphasizes minimizing
substantive constitutional mandates, many students tend to accept the
argument that the general ideals of freedom and fairness will be advanced
by new judicial barriers to federal protective legislation. Despite continuing
strong popular support for the idea of constitutional protection of individual
liberty, consistent with West’s theory, many now are likely to see that
protection as achievable mainly through a right to escape from legal power to
a realm of apparent self-reliance. From that narrowed perspective, problematic
police practices like those in Ferguson represent the inevitable corruption of
government power from cultural prejudice or economic pressure—perhaps
tragic, but largely beyond the scope of reasonable constitutional power and
protection.
Cruikshank pushes back against this resignation by exposing the Court’s
constitutional responsibility for actively shaping a legitimate and trustworthy
government. As William Forbath explains, Cruikshank stands for a tradition
of constitutional bad faith after the Civil War, in which the Court professed
constitutional passivity while constructing a new, enduring national order
institutionalizing white resistance to the Reconstruction Constitution’s
promise of racial justice.35 Cruikshank should remind us, as Pope further argues,
of the Court’s active role in forming and empowering the societal and political

31.

See Robin West, A Tale of Two Rights, 94 B.U. L. REV. 893, 894-95 (2014) (contrasting this new
paradigm of “exit” rights with civil “rights to enter” government protection).

32.

Id. at 898-900.

33.

Id. at 901-02.

34.

See id. at 896-97.

35.

William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6, 51 (1999) (discussing
how the Court’s illegitimate denial of constitutional Reconstruction led to a 20th-century
federal politics and administrative state dominated by Southern states).
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forces that then make meaningful constitutional correction of inequalities
appear intrusive and improbable.36
Cruikshank’s ghost also points toward an alternative understanding of
Lochner’s lesson. In the New Deal transformation of constitutional doctrine,
the Court rejected Lochner not only by deferring to the political process, but
also by establishing the constitutional legitimacy of a particular transformative
politics.37 Overturning Lochner meant that the Court lifted barriers that had
prevented workers and other ordinary citizens from (partly) participating in
governing conditions aﬀecting the value of their lives at work and beyond.
In rejecting Lochner, the Court questioned the idea that contractual bargaining
power constitutes individual freedom distinct from public force. In West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, for example, the Court explained that employers’ failure to
require a minimum living wage was not a natural exercise of freedom but
rather a contestable policy decision forcing communities to subsidize the
private gains from underpaid labor.38 From this contextualized perspective,
Lochner was wrong not simply because of judicial interference with policy and
politics, but because its interference gave constitutional protection for politics
and policies bent toward protecting unequal private force, including direct
violence suppressing labor organizing.
Confronting Cruikshank’s Enduring Constitutional Denials
Cruikshank’s similar history-changing protection of unequal politics backed
by unequal private violence came not from judicial creation of fundamental
rights as in Lochner, but from judicial creation of formal constitutional limits
on fundamental rights. Pope’s article identiﬁes Cruikshank’s four enduring
doctrinal principles: It gutted the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and
immunities clause; it established a narrow state action limit on due process and
equal protection; it imposed a strict racial intent requirement; and it narrowed
Congress’s power granted by the Reconstruction Amendments.39 These limits
operate to obscure and deny the Constitution’s potential for transformative
racial justice.
a) Privileges and Immunities
Cruikshank’s ﬁrst ground for invalidating the federal prosecution was that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of privileges and immunities of national
citizenship does not include the enumerated protections of the Bill of Rights,
36.

Pope, Snubbed Landmarks, supra note 13, at 435-38 (explaining how Cruikshank ‘s ruling helped
create the state structure and popular racial politics that then helped the Court appear
powerless to enforce voting rights).

37.

See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) (arguing that Lochner
was wrong not because of judicial “activism,” but because the Court wrongly and covertly
constitutionalized common law doctrines promoting economic inequality).

38.

300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937).

39.

See Pope, Snubbed Landmarks, supra note 13 at 388-89 (listing these doctrinal limits to show how
the case is “perhaps the single most important civil rights ruling” by the Court).

286

Journal of Legal Education

so these cannot count as federal rights triggering protection of the Enforcement
Act.40 Relying on an abstract discussion of federalism and the pre-Civil War
precedent of Barron v. Baltimore,41 the Court posited an exclusive sphere of
state sovereignty limiting the Bill of Rights to action directly involving the
federal government.42 The Court concluded that the massacre of a political
gathering at the Colfax courthouse did not implicate the First Amendment
right to free assembly nor the Second Amendment right to bear arms because
the direct purpose of the black Republicans’ political assembly was not access
to the federal government, nor was the federal government the direct source of
interference with their right to bear arms.43
Though this analysis takes a tone of dispassionate obedience to technical
detail and settled precedent, the ruling was a momentous departure from
prominent contemporary judicial opinion as well as an audacious (though
unacknowledged) judicial denial of the text, context, and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pope’s teaching materials contrast Cruikshank with
the 1871 Circuit Court decision in United States v. Hall,44 which upheld another
federal prosecution of white Democratic murders of black Republicans who
were gathered for a campaign rally. Pope’s note on the case explains that judicial
rulings like Hall provided authority for numerous successful prosecutions
of paramilitary attacks on black political participation in the early 1870s.45
Until Cruikshank terminated this authority, the prosecutions helped achieve
substantial progress toward the goal of establishing Reconstruction law and
democratic order in Southern states.46
Contrary to Cruikshank, Hall reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment has
“a vital bearing” on the question of whether its grant of new federal privileges
and immunities protects the Bill of Rights against the states, recognizing
the authority of the new constitutional text to override the pre-Civil War
precedent in Barron.47 Hall reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
privileges and immunities clause gives substantive content to the immediately
preceding clause guaranteeing national citizenship to all persons born in the
United States. Explaining that these clauses reverse the pre-Civil War order
of citizenship, so that state discretion over fundamental rights is replaced with
40.

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551-53.

41.

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

42.

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 549-50.

43.

Id. at 553.

44.

26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871). For Pope’s note on its privileges and immunities ruling,
see The Reconstruction Amendments, supra note 12, at 7 n.3.

45.

See Pope, The Reconstruction Amendments, supra note 12, at 11 (reporting historical evidence
that prosecutors obtained “numerous successful convictions, including 49 in North Carolina,
154 in South Carolina, and 597 in northern Mississippi, the main centers of Klan activity in
1868-1871”).

46.

Id. at 11.

47.

26 F. Cas. at 81.
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uniform and supreme federal government protection, Hall concluded that
“we are safe in concluding” that the federal protections “expressly secured”
in the Bill of Rights, including the right of peaceful assembly, are among the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.48
Cruikshank’s decision to instead deny incorporation of the Bill of Rights in
the privileges and immunities clause remains current constitutional law, even
though widely agreed to be without constitutional basis other than its status
as long-standing precedent.49 The typical constitutional law casebook uses the
Slaughterhouse Cases to present this doctrine in whitewashed innocuous form.
In that decision, rejecting white butchers’ claim of a fundamental right to do
business free from local health regulation, the privileges and immunities rule
emerges drained of substance and disconnected from any of the enumerated Bill
of Rights as well as from the core racial justice concerns of the Reconstruction
Amendments.50
Restoring Cruikshank as the basis for this doctrinal wrong turn matters.
Removed from context, its rule gutting federal privileges and immunities tends
to stand as a trivial technical glitch, because the 20th-century Supreme Court
gradually applied most of the Bill of Rights to the states through incorporation
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.51 But by deferring federal
protection of basic First Amendment freedoms for many decades after the Civil
War, Cruikshank undermined not only the public power of African-American
political participation but also the private power to organize independent
civic, religious, and economic activities—including multiracial coalitions of
workers—that are arguably as vital to meaningful political power as the right
to vote.52 Indeed, the historical suppression of labor organizing as part of
violent enforcement of racialized low-wage labor was intertwined with the
development of American policing, as Ahmed White analyzes.53 Further, in
contrast to the privileges and immunities clause, which protects citizens, the due
48.

Id.

49.

See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (acknowledging serious doubts
among scholars about the plausibility of the rule, and identifying its origins in Cruikshank as
well as the Slaughterhouse Cases, but nonetheless declining to disturb the precedent).

50.

Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13 at 389 (explaining the Slaughterhouse Cases as “an odd
choice to serve as a leading teaching vehicle on the issue”).

51.

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758 (rationalizing leaving Cruikshank’s rule undisturbed by instead using
the due process clause to incorporate the Second Amendment as a Fourteenth Amendment
right limiting the states).

52.

See Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 421, 440 (discussing Cruikshank’s impact narrowing
the focus of federal enforcement to limited protection of voting rights distinct from broader
civil rights). See also Kenneth M. Casebeer, “Public Since Time Immemorial . . .” The Labor History
of Hague v. CIO, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 147, 176 (2013) (discussing the importance of free
assembly rights denied in Cruikshank to the structure of legal, political and economic
institutions developed in response to the Great Depression).

53.

See Ahmed White, A Diﬀerent Kind of Labor Law, Vagrancy Law and the American Regulation of Harvest
Labor 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 669-70 (2004) (describing this integration of
criminal law and labor control as a major impetus in the development of policing).
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process clause shifted the substantive protections of the Bill of Rights from a
focus on human individuals to corporate property and proﬁt.54
Beyond the legal and historical eﬀects of deferring and redirecting Bill
of Rights protections, Cruikshank’s egregious reasoning on the privileges and
immunities clause launches a broader theory of constitutional powerlessness
and submission to external authority that continues to undermine constitutional
protection of African-American lives. Cruikshank’s rationale for excising the Bill
of Rights from the privileges and immunities clause focuses superﬁcially on
federalism principles. But the opinion’s formalistic analysis slips away from its
tainted and fraught privileging of state sovereignty. It conspicuously avoids
the speciﬁc questions of state power raised by the facts of this case involving
prosecution of a paramilitary attack on Reconstruction state government in
the aftermath of the Civil War’s Confederate defeat.
Instead, the Court’s opinion justiﬁes its denial of fundamental federal
rights by vaguely suggesting the Constitution’s subordination to natural
law. The Court presents the right of free assembly as a universal, ahistorical
attribute of citizenship and civilization55 that therefore does not depend on
the particular human law created by the Constitution. Coyly detached from
judgment about the speciﬁc substantive law and facts at issue, the Court
then asserts that the lesser authority of the federal Constitution lacks general
power to protect fundamental freedoms. Pope connects the opinion’s murky
assertion of state primacy over fundamental rights to a theory promoted by
some leaders at the time that state sovereignty signiﬁed not the authority of
speciﬁc oﬃcial government entities but rather a general natural entitlement by
Southern white people to veto government protection of African-Americans.56
This narrowing of constitutional protection to accommodate purportedly
superior and natural rights not surprisingly served to reinforce practical human
power to undermine Reconstruction. Exploring the reasoning underlying
Justice Bradley’s Circuit Court opinion, substantially followed in the Supreme
Court’s Cruikshank decision, Pope notes that Justice Bradley had written
extensively in support of maintaining what he believed was a natural economic
hierarchy dependent on legally enforced race and class subordination.57
In one sense, Cruikshank’s use of natural law to gut the privileges and
immunities clause and Bill of Rights reinforces the conventional lesson of Lochner:
that judicial power is least legitimate when it strays beyond clear constitutional
text and historical intent to embrace nebulous abstract ideals. Yet Cruikshank’s
problematic ruling also complicates that conventional lesson by showing the
54.

James Gray Pope, The Supreme Court, the Subjugation of Black Workers, and the Creation of the “White
Working Class,” 94 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Pope, The Supreme Court and the
“White Working Class”].

55.

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551.

56.

See Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 425 (discussing a theory promoted by President
Andrew Johnson and by scholarly commentators approving the Supreme Court’s decision).

57.

See id. at 418-21 (discussing Bradley’s extensive writings on labor and slavery).
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Court mobilizes shady ideals not only to inﬂate its constitutional role but also
to duck it, using those ideals to theorize a constitutional powerlessness that
overrides speciﬁc constitutional text and history. This broader problematic
principle of constitutional deference to pre-existing hierarchical order helps
sustain the other current doctrinal limits developed from Cruikshank.
b) State Action
Cruikshank ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due
process clauses also did not support the prosecution of the Colfax murders as
violations of federal rights under the Enforcement Act.58 The Court’s reasoning
emphasized the fundamental importance of equal government protection of
life and liberty, but again grounded this duty not in the speciﬁc Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional rights but in superior natural law linked to
state authority.59 From that position of constitutional modesty, Cruikshank
then narrowly read the Fourteenth Amendment’s text to prohibit states from
depriving life, liberty, or equal protection, concluding that this prohibition
did not include constitutional protection against harm from private action.60
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the unoﬃcial actions of murder in
Colfax did not count as violations of due process or equal protection rights
that could be prosecuted under the Enforcement Act.
Pope’s teaching materials contrast Cruikshank’s state action holding to the
reasoning in Hall,61 in which the Circuit Court explained that “[d]enying
includes inaction as well as action, and denying the equal protection of the
laws includes the omission to protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for
protection. The citizen of the United States is entitled to the enforcement of
the laws for the protection of his fundamental rights, as well as the enactment
of such laws.”62 Hall supported its interpretation with the Fourteenth
Amendment text and federalism principles, explaining that the Enforcement
Act was an exercise of Congress’ enumerated power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment with appropriate legislation. Hall reasoned that direct federal
enforcement appropriately respects states’ constitutional role by correcting
failures in state protection without interfering with state authority.63
Cruikshank instead ignored both the Amendment’s enumerated grant of
enforcement power and the actual facts of public and private power in the
case, using selective strict adherence to constitutional text to mask judicial
evisceration of Reconstruction. Cruikshank characterized the case as a problem
58.

See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553-54 (discussing due process); id. at 554-55 (discussing equal
protection).

59.

See id. at 553-54 (describing the government responsibility for protecting all citizens’ lives as
an inalienable right endowed by “the Creator”).

60.

Id. at 555.

61.

Pope, The Reconstruction Amendments, supra note 12, at 17 n.2.

62.

United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871).

63.

Id.

290

Journal of Legal Education

involving “the rights of one citizen as against the other,” as if the political
massacre were a routine legal conﬂict on a level playing ﬁeld rather than a
paramilitary attack aimed at denying citizenship and overturning government
in the wake of the Civil War.64 The Court’s superﬁcial federalist deference,
as Pope’s notes on the case explain, ignored that the federal prosecution
was responding to well-known breakdown of state authority in the face of
rampant terrorism. For example, the state of Louisiana had sought the federal
intervention in this case after an attempted state criminal prosecution of
the murders was thwarted by an attacking mob threatening to kill the state
prosecutor.65 Despite the Court’s allusion to competing private “rights,” it was
the judgment of the federal Justices, not state law, that infused the violence
with both practical and legal power. As Pope argues, the Court deferred to
unlawful private terrorism aimed at seizing state power, not to more legitimate
state authority, thereby enabling this private force to secure seemingly
legitimate political power in both state and federal government.66 Cruikshank’s
narrow state action limit on equal protection contributed to institutionalized
unequal protection for many generations after the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the prevailing narrative, bold judicial leadership in Brown v. Board of
Education67 redeemed the Constitution’s failed Reconstruction promise of equal
protection.68 But without directly challenging the distorted equal protection
vision of Cruikshank, the narrative gives an incomplete and uneasy view of
Brown’s judicial initiative. Brown’s reasoning does not identify the fundamental
illegitimacy of the political processes that produced school segregation, nor
does it mention the web of oﬃcial and unoﬃcial racial violence that supported
those processes and the resulting policies of segregation. The equal protection
doctrine that emerged from Brown established heightened judicial scrutiny for
race discrimination as an exception to the general 20th-century principle of
judicial deference to political process established in the shadow of Lochner.
Framed by Lochner, with Cruikshank’s legacy out of view, Brown’s exceptional
judicial power stands in the canon as constitutionally threatening, even if
morally noble. To provide principled ground for Brown’s focus on substantive
racial harms not detailed in text or history, the constitutional canon (though
not Brown itself) relies on Carolene Products,69 a case involving a now-obscure
substantive dispute (regulation of “ﬁlled milk”) irrelevant to racial injustice.
The famous Footnote 4 of that case explained that the Court’s rejection of
64.

92 U.S. at 554-55.

65.

Pope, The Reconstruction Amendments, supra note 12, at 19-20 n.7; Pope, Snubbed Landmark,
supra note 13, at 410.

66.

Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 434-40 (analyzing historical evidence showing the
impact of Cruikshank on ending Reconstruction).

67.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

68.

See Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 391 (arguing that Cruikshank challenges this
narrative of redemption).

69.

309 U.S. 144 (1938).
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Lochner still permits judicial intervention in substantive policy to address
exclusion or bias in the political process, especially prejudice against “discrete
and insular minorities.”70
Carolene Products inscribes heightened constitutional protection of racial
equality as countermajoritarian, positioning African-Americans as victims
dependent on anti-democratic authority.71 The ghost of Cruikshank instead
reveals a more complete picture of judicial minimization of constitutional
racial protection as a similarly dangerous countermajoritarian force. In the
case itself, Cruikshank’s narrowing of equal protection through the state
action doctrine meant the federal government did not prosecute the violent
overthrow of black majority power in a local Louisiana election. The case
cleared the way for white minority rule in the several former Confederate
states with black majorities. As Pope argues, attention to Cruikshank expands
the historical narrative by showing that African-Americans have been quite
capable of mobilizing democratic power beyond their “discrete and insular”
numbers, altering existing patterns of prejudice and power by building local
electoral coalitions with white workers, for example,72 and also through
Reconstruction coalitions at the federal level that produced the Enforcement
Act. This developing majoritarian power withered not from lack of special
judicial protection, but rather from Cruikshank’s extraordinary judicial refusal
to uphold democratic law against extralegal terrorism.
By presenting Brown in the shadow of Lochner but not Cruikshank, the
constitutional canon helps redeem the continuing use of the narrow state
action doctrine in the decades after Brown to limit the remedial scope of the
civil rights initiatives of what has been called the second Reconstruction.
Majoritarian race-conscious lawmaking appears to be the main culprit in the
history of constitutional racial inequality, so that judicial intervention tailored
narrowly to direct government race-based action appears to correct the problem
while also promoting the virtues of judicial restraint counseled by Lochner’s
ghost. The state action doctrine has helped scale down Brown’s promise of
racial integration to a formal ban on government racial classiﬁcation, treating
pervasive continuing racial segregation as a normal and constitutionally
legitimate feature of American schools, communities, economic opportunity,
and electoral districts.
Echoing Cruikshank, the state action doctrine today neutralizes the power
that fuels this racial inequality in and out of government by treating it as the
naturalized result of free individual preferences mediated by benign forces of

70.

Id. at 152 n.4.

71.

Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 392 (arguing Cruikshank’s importance in challenging
that portrayal of African-Americans in constitutional law).

72.

For an analysis of the potential for multiracial coalitions impeded by the Court, see Martha
Mahoney, What’s Left of Solidarity? Reﬂections on Law, Race and Labor History, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1515
(2009); Pope, The Supreme Court and the “White Working Class”, supra note 54.
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market and culture.73 The doctrine institutionalizes constitutional disregard
for government’s failure to enforce antidiscrimination laws that would have
shaped diﬀerent markets and cultures. And it legitimates the government
policies that institutionalized disregard and ill regard for African-American
lives by subsidizing and enforcing divided and unequal private housing, social
services, infrastructure, electoral districts, and economic development. The
resulting pervasive local racial segregation creates the conditions central to
producing and perpetuating the racially disparate police practices found in
Ferguson.74
c) Racial Intent
Of course, the Black Lives Matter movement focuses directly on the
persistent problem of oﬃcial government unequal protection, not private
action. A third lasting doctrine established by Cruikshank combines with the
state action requirement to further impede constitutional protection against
government disregard for black lives. In Cruikshank, the Court rejected the
indictment’s charge of violation of Fifteenth Amendment rights because the
defendants acted with intent “to hinder and prevent the citizens named, being
of African descent, and colored” from freely exercising their right to vote.75
Again deﬂating the substantive power of the Reconstruction Amendments,
the Court explained that the right to vote is not fundamental to national
citizenship, and that Fifteenth Amendment protection is limited to protecting
the right to vote against discrimination on account of race, leaving the general
right to vote in the hands of the states.76
The opinion did not go further to discuss the general purpose and
legislative history of the amendment and the Enforcement Act to shed light
on what should count as discrimination on account of race. Nor did it consider
the text of the Amendment’s grant of congressional enforcement power as
authorizing Congress to regulate a broader swath of actions (like mass murder
of African-American voters) that Congress, in its experience, deemed necessary
and appropriate to enforcing this constitutional protection against race
discrimination in voting. Contrary to the Circuit Court opinions in other cases
73.

For an extensive and brilliant critique of the state action doctrine, see Kenneth M. Casebeer,
The Empty State and Nobody’s Market: The Political Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial
Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 MIAMI L. REV.247 (2000).

74.

For a detailed discussion of the government racial inequality and uncorrected constitutional
violations underlying recent police violence, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE
MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://s3.epi.
org/ﬁles/2014/making-of-ferguson-ﬁnal.pdf; Richard Rothstein, From Ferguson to Baltimore,
The Fruits of Government-Sponsored Racial Segregation, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG,
(Apr. 29, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/from-ferguson-to-baltimore-the-fruits-ofgovernment-sponsored-segregation/ (applying this analysis to the context of Baltimore’s
police violence and the police custody death of Freddie Gray).
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of the recent period (not mentioned in Cruikshank),77 the Court concluded that
the indictment failed because it did not explicitly allege that the defendants’
violence directed against African-Americans’ political activity was speciﬁcally
on account of their race. According to the opinion, “We may suspect that race was
the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred.”78
In denying constitutional protection against race discrimination in this
case, the Court claimed to subsume its own substantive judgment to formal
technicality. Yet the Court directed its legal power and technical eﬀorts to
rationalizing its refusal to see the openly ﬂaunted and widely sensationalized
racial meaning of the violence at stake in the case. That refusal likely helped
amplify and institutionalize that racial meaning, reﬂected in a 1921 Colfax
cemetery monument to the massacre, still standing uncorrected in the 21st
century, honoring the white “heroes” who died “ﬁghting for white supremacy.”79
In its doctrine of racial intent, Cruikshank used the cover of judicial restraint
from substantive judgment to constitutionalize deliberate blindness to racial
injustice.
In addition to the speciﬁc historic impact of this narrow intent doctrine,
analyzed in Pope’s article,80 the canon’s ongoing failure to confront the
doctrine’s origin in Cruikshank signals a norm of low expectations for
constitutional transformation of racial wrongs. From Cruikshank through the
present, the narrow intent doctrine incorporates a steep presumption in favor
of treating oﬃcial harm to black lives as the natural or necessary result of
generally beneﬁcial policy. In the standard narrative, the original Constitution’s
failure to renounce slavery was a tragic tradeoﬀ sacriﬁcing African-American
lives and citizenship as the price of building a legal order otherwise advancing
the ideals of liberty and democracy.81 Cruikshank’s disregard is more insidious
because it sacriﬁced African-American lives in order to disrupt rather than to
advance a more democratic legal order. By perpetuating Cruikshank’s narrow
recognition of race discrimination, current doctrine continues to invest in a
legal order designed to discount harm to black lives.

77.

See Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 424-25 (contrasting Cruikshank’s reasoning on
congressional enforcement power and racial intent to other judicial rulings of the time).
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Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556.

79.

See, e.g., Matt LaRoche, Tributes to Terror: The Mismonumentation of the Colfax Massacre, GETTYSBURG
COMPILER (Mar. 27, 2015), http://wp.me/p3dApw-xk.

80.

See Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 428-30 (arguing that even though Cruikshank’s
technical requirement for showing racial intent left open theoretical possibilities for federal
prosecution, in practice and combined with its other rulings the rule allowed narrow judicial
interpretations to preclude successful enforcement).
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The typical constitutional law course teaches the intent doctrine through
the 1976 ruling in Washington v. Davis,82 which rejected an equal protection
challenge to a qualifying test for District of Columbia municipal police oﬃcers
that disproportionately excluded African-American police applicants. Davis
ruled that, standing alone, evidence of discriminatory racial impact does not
count as purposeful race discrimination triggering constitutional heightened
scrutiny. This doctrine allowed the Court to accept the dubious rationality
of the qualifying test, leaving its specious technical questions out of sight, to
instead legitimate the resulting inequality as judicial deference to a reasonable
policy preference.
This narrow standard has contributed to the diﬃculties of challenging the
current legal landscape where racially unrepresentative police departments
and racially disparate police practices are pervasive. Presenting the doctrine
through Davis, separate from Cruikshank, the rule appears to represent principled
restraint from judicial interference with substantive policy, credibly obeying
Lochner’s lesson of deference to democratic political and executive processes.
Davis supports its narrow intent doctrine with precedent, removed from details
of the constitutional history and purpose.83 Cruikshank instead grounds that
precedent in a historically important judicial rejection of text, history, purpose,
and precedent. Casting a diﬀerent shadow on the rule, Cruikshank reveals its
superﬁcial judicial restraint as a powerful tool for usurping constitutional
responsibility for the legitimacy of those processes.
d) Congress’ Reconstruction Amendment powers
A ﬁnal doctrinal move in Cruikshank has assumed new power in recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. As Pope’s article and teaching materials
highlight, Cruikshank ignored other courts’ reasoning that Congress’s
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement power conferred authority to decide
the appropriate policy means to enforce the new constitutional rights.84 Like
Cruikshank, the current doctrine arguably departs from established principles of
McCulloch v. Maryland, along with Reconstruction Amendment text and history,
to erect steeper standards for what Congress can count as inequality or state
action deserving federal correction in exercising its Reconstruction powers.85
The Court’s doctrine eﬀectively imposing heightened judicial scrutiny on
congressional Reconstruction enforcement powers can be viewed as a Lochnerlike judicial usurpation of democratic substantive judgment. But the Court
82.

426 U.S. 229 (1976). See Pope, Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 390 (criticizing the
constitutional canon’s reliance on this case to present the intent doctrine).

83.

See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239-41.

84.

See Pope, The Reconstruction Amendments, supra note 12, at 7, 18 (discussing the reasoning
in Hall as well as in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866)); Pope,
Snubbed Landmark, supra note 13, at 402 (discussing the congressional and judicial arguments
supporting Congress’ power).

85.

See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636-37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s failure to defer to congressional judgment).
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rationalizes its skepticism of Congress’ Reconstruction Act judgment as
deference to what it presents as the more democratic and natural authority of
decentralized states. By linking this doctrine to the ghost of Cruikshank as well
as to the ghost of Lochner, we can go further to challenge the current Court’s
selective revival of countermajoritarian principle. Cruikshank reveals that the
narrowing of congressional enforcement power is less about deference to the
states than to a judicial vision of naturalized order beyond constitutional
power to transform.
For example, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court’s emphasis on state
sovereignty discounts the unanimous state political endorsement of the Voting
Rights Act reauthorization in the Senate, bypassing this constitutional process
for protecting state interests. Instead focusing on the abstract indignity to
states of the Act’s targeted federal oversight, the Court assumes this oversight
is naturally and necessarily stigmatizing and degrading rather than a means to
state leadership and excellence.86
Rationalizing its scrutiny of congressional judgment, the Shelby County
majority emphasizes that the Voting Rights Act is “extraordinary” in its
intrusion into states’ traditional control of voting.87 The Court acknowledged
this tradition included enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment followed by “a
century of failure of Congressional enforcement”88 so that race discrimination
was entrenched by “unremitting and ingenious constitutional deﬁance.”89
But the Court failed to acknowledge that its own evisceration of Congress’s
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement power was a key factor in establishing
this tradition of constitutional deﬁance. Nor does Shelby County acknowledge
that the resulting “ordinary” state electoral practices were pervasively shaped
by extralegal violence rather than legitimate state authority. As Pope’s article
notes, the current canon obscures these problems by grounding the doctrine
of Reconstruction Amendment limits not in Cruikshank but instead in the case
of City of Boerne v. Flores,90 removed from the context of racial justice.91
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See id. at 2616 (describing preclearance as a degrading act forcing states to “beseech” the
federal government for permission to exercise their entitled powers); Martha T. McCluskey,
Toward a Fundamental Right to Evade Law? The Rule of Power in Shelby County and State Farm, 17
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 216, 225 (2015) (criticizing the Court’s construction of
harm to state dignity from law enforcement and comparing it to similar reasoning about
harm from deterring illegal activity by corporate defendants).
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296

Journal of Legal Education

Cruikshank’s Lesson
Standing alongside Lochner, Cruikshank’s ghost should teach that judicial
evasion of substantive judgment in the guise of judicial restraint is a
technique of illegitimate power as destructive as judicial commandeering
of substantive law. The standard narrative begins with Marbury v. Madison’s92
tension between judicial power and majoritarian law. But with Cruikshank at
the center, that case could also set the stage for a constitutional drama about
judicial responsibility for creating a more principled and lawful democratic
order. In that founding case, Justice Marshall’s ambitious reasoning and result
embraces the Constitution’s transformative potential. His seemingly technical
analysis of the case’s minor and major issues repeatedly insists on subjecting
practical power to law and on making legal principle powerful. For example,
in the opinion’s analysis of preliminary issues, before discussing the power
of judicial review, Marshall declares, “The government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy
for the violation of a vested legal right.”93
Lochner’s ghost remains an important warning about the ongoing dangers
of judicial power, but its lesson should not become an excuse for judicial
complicity in constructing law’s powerlessness. Cruikshank should warn us that
the legacy of failure of government protection for African-Americans is neither
the product of inherent trade-oﬀs of noble principles of liberty and security
nor the result of inevitable weakness and corruption of human power. Instead,
it is built on constitutional rules that continue to excuse judicial construction
of many inequalities and injustices as natural hierarchical power beyond the
law, even while erecting new judicial barriers to political and legal eﬀorts to
transform these problems. In a brilliant and extensive analysis of the limiting
doctrines of state action and racial intent, Kenneth Casebeer summarizes
contemporary constitutional law as “systematically undemocratic in content . .
. a danger for all the people even as the Court cynically celebrates majoritarian
form in the denial of constitutional and civil rights for minorities.”94
Directly repudiating Cruikshank as well as Lochner would open the canon to
more nuanced and promising constitutional principles for constraining both
judicial and political failures. Casebeer revises Lochner’s lesson by oﬀering
principles for guiding judicial review toward accountability for judicial
substantive judgments.95 Rather than relying on formal principles of restraint,
Casebeer’s guidelines respond to the countermajoritarian diﬃculty by pushing
Courts to investigate and explain the implications and impact of technical
rulings on democratic values in light of actual societal conditions.
92.
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Constitutional rules inevitably shape whose lives matter. Constitutional
legitimacy—both in the Court and in the political branches—necessarily
requires judges to exercise independent substantive judgment and leadership
as much as judicial deference and self-discipline. The wrongs of Ferguson
persist not despite constitutional law but because of insuﬃcient professional,
scholarly, and popular outrage and resistance directed at challenging particular
constitutional doctrines of deceptive minimalism. By orienting constitutional
law to Cruikshank’s ghost, we can better disturb the constitutional complacency
that has helped erode the Constitution’s promise of racial justice.

